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Abstract 
 
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role 
in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the 
legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its 
earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions. 
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1. The OMT controversy and how it became central to the German 
Constitutional Court’s deliberations in summer 2013 
The European Central Bank’s August 2, 2012 announcement that it would be willing 
to buy government bonds without limit in certain scenarios arguably constitutes the most 
controversial decision in its 15-year history. Already the limited purchases of euro crisis 
countries’ sovereign bonds under the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) since May 
2012 had been cited as the reason for the resignations of Axel Weber, then-President of the 
Bundesbank and member of the ECB Governing Council, and Jürgen Stark, then the ECB 
Board Member in charge of its Directorate General Economics.  The 2012 announcement of 
potentially unlimited future Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) was publicly opposed by 
Jens Weidmann, Weber’s successor as Bundesbank President, and has been criticized heavily 
by former ECB Board Members Otmar Issing and Jürgen Stark, while Stark’s successor, Jörg 
Asmussen, turned out to be a staunch supporter of this policy.  Weidmann and Asmussen 
have been called to testify during the hearings of the Federal Constitutional Court on June 11-
12, 2013 on the legitimacy of the OMT.  In this note, we review the legal issues and concerns 
regarding the OMT that will be the focus of the Court’s deliberations and discuss potential 
outcomes.  
 
As explained by ECB President Mario Draghi in the statement for the August 2, 2012 
ECB press conference, the ECB was concerned at the time that exceptionally high risk premia 
embodied in government bond prices for some euro area member countries were hindering the 
transmission of monetary policy in that part of the monetary union. Specifically, he 
considered risk premia that are related to fears of the reversibility of the euro as the currency 
of these countries as unacceptable. While emphasizing that governments would need to push 
ahead with fiscal consolidation, structural reform and European institution-building in order 
for those risk premia to disappear, Draghi also called on them to request support by the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 
the bond market when exceptional financial circumstances and risks to financial stability 
exist. In those circumstances, the ECB would then be willing to buy sovereign bonds in the 
quantity needed to reduce the above-mentioned risk premia.  Such interventions would thus 
be subject to the conditionality imposed on the respective government by the EFSF/ESM. 
Importantly, the ECB would forego seniority status and its holdings of these sovereign bonds 
would be subject to the same losses as privately-held bonds in the event of a sovereign 3 
 
default. The technical features of the OMT are described in the ECB Press Release of 
September 6, 2012 that is also found in the appendix to this note.  
 
In the judgement of critics of the OMT, the ECB has ventured too far into the terrain 
of fiscal policy by announcing such potentially unlimited government bond purchases. The 
announcement itself is likely to cause delays in the implementation of necessary fiscal and 
structural adjustments by national governments, because it has reduced market pressures via 
government financing conditions.  Furthermore, such purchases may violate the prohibition of 
monetary financing of sovereign entities in the EMU.  ECB critics question whether the OMT 
and earlier SMP comply with the general prohibition of granting loans by the European 
Central Bank or national central banks in favour of any type of government entity or public 
undertaking (Article 123 paragraph 1, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)). The critics emphasize that subsidizing interest rates of selected countries’ 
government debt or even saving insolvent governments transcends the powers and 
competences given to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  Furthermore, they call 
into doubt the ECB’s assessment that the transmission of monetary policy is disturbed by 
unfounded or irrational fears of investors that need to be counteracted by such interventions. 
Importantly, critics of the OMT argue that the current membership of the euro-zone cannot be 
guaranteed as long as Member States remain sovereign, at least not by the European Central 
Bank.  If the justification of these measures as an act of monetary policy is rejected, they must 
be considered acts of economic policy that are not conferred on the Union. They are reserved 
for the Member States (Article 119 paragraph 1 and 2, Article 127 paragraph 2 and 5 TFEU).  
Finally, critics fear that the independence of the ECSB and of the members of their decision-
making bodies is jeopardized by the large-scale transfer of credit risks from the private and 
public sector to the ECSB. Their independence is guaranteed by Article 130, 282 paragraph 3 
clause 2 TFEU, Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank, and by Article 88 clause 2 of the German Federal Constitution.  
 
The subject matter of the case presently pending at the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany was initially focusing on the EFSF/ESM support mechanism set up by Member 
States of the EU and its legal foundation. More specifically, three legal acts of the German 
legislature to transform the agreements on the European level into German law had come 
under scrutiny of the court: 4 
 
1.  Consent to the creation of a basis in the primary law of the Union for setting up 
a support mechanism (amendment to Article 136 TFEU) 
2.  Implementation of the compact on enhanced fiscal stability 
3.  Putting into effect of the agreement on the (permanent) European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
 
The actions of the ESCB and the ECB to assist Member States with financial problems were 
originally not central to the petitions.   
 
A preliminary injunction had been requested in order to prevent the international acts to 
become effective before the Court could decide the case. The injunction was denied under 
certain provisions by the decision of the Court of September 12, 2012. In its opinion, the 
Court mentioned that ECB purchases of sovereign bonds on secondary markets with the aim 
of financing government budgets independently from capital markets would violate the 
prohibition of monetary financing. However, the Court left the question whether this 
prohibition applies to the SMP or OMT open for the final decision that was then expected to 
be handed down in July 2013 (Judgement of September 12, 2012, text numbers 202 and 278). 
Subsequently, petitioners have extended their petitions and asked the court explicitly to 
review the measures of the ECB and ECSB member central banks as well.  
 
The Court has asked both the ECB and the Deutsche Bundesbank to deliver an opinion 
on aspects of the controversy. The Bundesbank has submitted a statement dating from 
December 21, 2012. This statement has been leaked to the public and raises many of the 
concerns mentioned above. The ECB has asked a German law professor, Frank Schorkopf, to 
prepare a statement as its representative. A comprehensive oral hearing is scheduled for June 
11 and 12. 
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2. What is the German Constitutional Court deliberating and deciding on? 
2.1 Jurisdiction 
 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has been installed to enforce the norms 
of the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”), the federal constitution, and to review the conformity of 
all German state actions with the federal constitution. That is why the court is restrained to 
apply the norms of the Basic Law. The conformity of actions with the laws of the European 
Union, and specifically with the European Treaties (“primary law”), does not fall into the 
German Court’s competence. In fact, if the Court finds that the interpretation of the Treaties is 
concerned or that the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union is in question, it has to refer it to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
for a ruling, Article 267 paragraph 1 TFEU. However, such a referral is only needed if such a 
clarification by the ECJ is of substantial relevance for the adjudication of the case by the 
national court, Article 267 paragraph 2 TFEU. This rule holds for all courts or tribunals of 
Member States against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law; Article 
267 paragraph 3 TFEU. Thus, in principle, also the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
would have to refer a case to the ECJ. However, such a referral has never taken place so far. It 
would be a novelty in the history of the Court.  
 
There are, however, exceptions: The Court has reserved the right to review itself— 
without referral to the ECJ—whether a particular act of an organ or institution of the EU stays 
within the limits of the competences and powers conferred on the EU (BVerfGE 89, 155 
[188]; 123, 267 [353 et seq.]). To its opinion such a transgression is not covered by the 
parliamentary consent to the transfer of sovereign rights and is considered to be „ultra vires“, 
that is, beyond the legal power or authority of the European institution (“ausbrechender 
Rechtsakt”). Moreover, the court examines if the transfer of sovereign rights to the European 
Union level maintains the unalienable core of the constitutional identity (“unantastbarer 
Kernbereich der Verfassungsidentität”) of the Basic Law (BVerfGE 123, 267 [268, 354]; 
restated in BVerfGE 129, 124 [177] in view of the democratic rights of the electorate. These 
caveats have been theoretical so far. The Court has not yet invoked them in a specific case. 
Already in its decision on the Lisbon Treaty it demanded that the transgression of competence 
must be clearly visible (“ersichtlich”). In the ensuing Honeywell case it has further specified 
that the act challenged in court must be grave and have the quality to lead to a structural shift 6 
 
in the design of competences at the expense of Member States (BVerfGE 126, 286). It also 
concedes to perform such a review only in a cooperative manner with the ECJ, which would 
mean to ask for a prior opinion of this court. 
 
Aside from the above considerations that are centered around European Union law, 
there is also a direct way to a judicial review by the court applying German constitutional law. 
Article 88 clause 2 of the Basic Law deals with the transfer of the monetary authority to a 
European institution. It could be directly used as a yardstick for judging the measures of the 
ESCB. The provision requires that the European monetary institution must be independent 
and committed to the superior goal of price stability. Whether this requirement has been 
obeyed has to be scrutinized by the Court itself. The Court’s jurisdiction, in principle, only 
covers actions of German authorities. However, the participation of the Bundesbank within 
the framework of the ECSB may be sufficient for a decision that the review of this action falls 
into the competence of the Court.    
 
 
2.2. Application 
 
(1) In any case, the Court first has to decide whether an individual complaint pursuant 
to Article 93 no. 4a of the Basic Law challenging the conformity of the measures of the 
monetary authorities with Article 88 clause 2 of the Basic Law is admissible. This might be 
questioned with good reasons as it has to be demonstrated that individual rights of the 
petitioners are possibly infringed. An infringement of property rights—protected by Article 
14 Basic Law—is unlikely, at least at the present situation. In recent cases concerning acts on 
the European level, democratic participation has, however, been judged as a sufficient cause 
of action by the court (BVerfGE 123, 267; BVerfGE 129, 124).  
 
Looking at the merits of the case, so far price stability has been interpreted as 
“consumer price stability” (Siekmann, in: Sachs [ed.], Grundgesetz, 6. Auflage, Art. 88 
Rdn. 89). As the harmonized consumer price index (HICP) which is generally accepted as a 
metric, lingers at a historically low level a verdict will probably not be based on this part of 
Article 88 clause 2 Basic Law. Endangering independence by the envisaged – almost 
symbiotic - cooperation of the ECB with administrative agencies could, however, be an issue. 7 
 
 
(2) As the seriousness of an infringement of European Union Law is decisive for the 
ensuing procedural steps, it ought to be assessed in the first place.  
 
Already the Securities Market Program is difficult to justify with the goal of 
addressing malfunctioning or non-functioning in the channels of transmission of monetary 
policy as the ECB has claimed.  Questions such as what exactly are the appropriate risk 
premia and what is the necessary degree of intervention by the ECB in light of the many 
factors influencing such premia, including the statements and actions of many national and 
other European policy makers, have remained largely unanswered.  
 
With the Outright Monetary Transactions, the ECB officially „aims at safeguarding an 
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy“ (ECB 
press release of September 6, 2012).  They do not fall into the domain of the generally 
accepted standard open market operations which are in accordance with Article 18.1 of the 
Statute. They do not serve as a tool to gauge the interest rate for risk free loans. Effectively, 
they imply subsidies in favour of specific countries and institutions by lowering risk premia 
demanded by the market. Importantly, standard open market operations are designed as an 
instrument aimed at fine-tuning the monetary environment for the complete area of a currency 
and not for specific regions of the area or single credit institutions. Of course, the financial 
crisis and threat of deflation has also led other central banks around the world to purchase 
government debt. However, this debt has been federal or national debt rather than debt of 
regional authorities.  For example, the Federal Reserve System of the United States has 
bought federal debt but it has not bought state debt and has not used government debt 
purchases to mitigate financial problems of troubled states such as, for example, California. In 
Germany, neither the Bundesbank nor the Reichsbank have historically used debt purchases to 
mitigate financial problems of one of the member states (Länder). 
 
„Strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial 
Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme“ is referred to by 
the ECB as a necessary condition for any Outright Monetary Transaction. However, this 
provision, which implies close cooperation with executive authorities in administering 
support programs by making them a prerequisite for OMT measures, can also be interpreted 
to indicate that the envisaged measures fall outside the area of monetary policy as these 8 
 
conditions serve to achieve other economic and fiscal objectives. Similarly, the unlimited 
volume of the measures points in that direction. 
 
By tethering the support to decisions of a government agency (EFSF/ESM) the ESCB 
may also endanger the autonomy in its decision making. The primary law of the Union 
assesses this independence as crucial. A mutual dependence of central bank action and 
administrative decisions would not conform to the design of the Monetary Union and its 
distribution of powers. Additionally, it can well be questioned whether the conditionality will 
in effect work as a safeguard against an inacceptable transfer of risks to monetary institutions. 
In the case of Greece, for example, private sector investors had to accept haircuts on 
government debt in a more or less voluntary private sector involvement. If the ECB does not 
insist on seniority status in such a case as promised with the OMT, losses on its portfolio 
would have to be borne either by the ECB or assumed by other government agencies.  
 
(3) Turning again to the procedural aspects of the pending case, the court has to decide 
whether the (possible) infringements of the primary law of the Union by the measures of the 
central banks of the Euro system are so serious that they lead to a structural shift in the design 
of competences at the expense of Member States (BVerfGE 126, 286). Article 3 paragraph 1 
lit. c TFEU transfers the (exclusive) competence for the monetary policy to the Union. This is 
a structural decision. Further tasks may only be conferred to the ECB under the narrow 
preconditions and within the close limits of Article 127 paragraph 6 TFEU which has not 
been activated so far. Most importantly, a mandate to secure financial stability has not been 
given to the ESCB. According to Article 127 paragraph 5 TFEU (Article  3.1. of the statute) it 
has only been charged with contributing to the “smooth conduct” of the measures taken by the 
“competent authorities”. This can only mean that the other authorities are competent and have 
to take up the actions deemed to be necessary. The ESCB is restricted to an ancillary role in 
this field (for the strict separation of “monetary policy” and “economic policy” by the primary 
law see Siekmann, Einführung No. 121 et seq., Art. 119 No. 22 et seq., in: Siekmann (ed.), 
Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion, 2013).  
 
The other leg of the court’s reservation: unalienable core of the constitutional identity 
(“unantastbarer Kernbereich der Verfassungsidentität”) of the Basic Law is basically aimed at 
further transfers of powers and is not touched sufficiently in substance. 
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Looking at the overall system of the distribution of competences, the transgression 
gets close to the line the court has drawn in its previous decisions. It remains, however, 
doubtful, if it will really invoke its reserved right to review an act of an institution of the EU.  
 
(4) If the court sees a (possible) breach of the law of the Union and does not decide to 
review the acts in question by itself, it has to consider a referral to the ECJ. The necessary act 
of an organ or institution of the Union is given. But it is not sure that a judgement on the 
conformity of the measures taken by the ESCB, and of the ECB specifically, is a necessary 
prerequisite for a decision on the three original subject matters of the case, that is, (i) 
amending the primary law of the Union by inserting a paragraph 3 in Article 136 TFEU 
dealing with support measures of Member States, (ii) agreement of Member States on fiscal 
soundness – new fiscal compact and (iii) agreement on establishing the support mechanism 
ESM.  
 
These questions, especially the amendment of the TFEU, do touch on the conformity 
with European Union law but a compelling junction with the measures of the monetary 
institutions is not apparent. It could also be argued that the mere design of OMT is not 
decisive for the pending case but only the actual purchase of bonds. If the court follows this 
line of thinking, it could once more refrain from invoking Article 267 TFEU and leave the 
questions of European Union Law open as it has done in the previous cases. 
 
 
2.3. Consequences 
 
(1) Provided the court comes to the result that former bond buying programs or OMT 
are not in conformity with Article 88 Basic Law or transgress competences of the Union in 
the required serious scope, German authorities would not be allowed to participate in any 
actions performing or promoting them. As the national central banks play a key role in 
executing the purchases implied by these programs, the Bundesbank would in this case not be 
allowed to participate in these actions any further.  
 
Normally, the Bundesbank is required to follow instructions of the ECB (Article 14.3 
of the statute of ECSB and ECB). However, if the ECB’s were to be judged illegal by the 10 
 
German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesbank would not have to implement them 
anymore.   Possibly it would even be obliged to use all legal instruments to fend off measures 
that have been judged as illegal by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Specifically, the 
Bundesbank would have to resort to litigation before the ECJ following Article 263 paragraph 
4 TFEU. 
 
It is an open and undecided question whether acts of the ESCB or the ECB that have 
been judged as a breach of German constitutional law are void and thus legally not existing. 
 
(2) Provided the court comes to the result that a breach of the primary law has taken 
place and a ruling is necessary for adjudicating the case, it has to refer it to the ECJ. This will 
usually lead to a considerable delay of the final decision. 
 
(3) Provided the German court would either not see a breach of European Union Law 
or refrain from a referral to the ECJ, the final judgement of the case may well be handed down 
in July as anticipated last fall.  
 
3. Potential outcomes of the Court’s deliberations 
 
The Court could still deny the admissibility of the complaint regarding the measures 
of the ESCB. This result appears to be fairly unlikely since the Court has put on its agenda for 
the hearing taking place on June 11, 2013, detailed questions concerning actions of the ECB, 
specifically OMT. Additionally, one part of the court action has been petitioned in a specific 
procedure by the members of the Bundestag of the Party “The Left/ die Linke”. Such a 
procedure concerning a conflict between high-level state institutions regarding their 
constitutional rights ( the so-called “Organstreitverfahren”) follows reduced requirements for 
admissibility. Thus, it can be expected that the Court will decide on the merits of the case.  
 
But even if the Court judges SMP and OMT to violate the provisions of EU-law, there 
are high hurdles to come to the result that the measure are “ultra vires” and violate as such 
German constitutional law. In this case a referral to the ECJ has to be considered. It would, 
however, be a novelty in the Court’s history and appears to be fairly unlikely.  
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More likely is however an outcome in a way that has been used fairly frequently by 
the Court: a “yes, but”. It could underline its concerns but not adjudicate the measures in 
question as illegal on their face and could emphasize the limits for actions of the ESCB. 
Specifically the (future) implementation of measures in the framework of OMT may be 
constrained, for example by stating which bonds cannot legally be purchased as they are not 
marketable, or by setting limits in respect of duration and volume, or by not allowing to take a 
haircut in restructuring the debt as this might be judged an economic policy action outside the 
realm of monetary policy.  
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ECB Press Release of 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright 
Monetary Transactions 
 
As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the 
Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at 
safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary 
policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be 
conducted within the following framework: 
 
 
Conditionality 
 
A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective 
conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European 
Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full 
EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced 
Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary 
market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the 
country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme. 
 
The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they 
are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is 
fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-
compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme. 
 
Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, 
continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting 
in accordance with its monetary policy mandate. 
 
 
Coverage 
 
Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. 
They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme when they will be regaining bond market access. 
 
Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on 
sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. 
 
No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions. 
 
 
Creditor treatment 
 
The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions 
that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to 
bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright 
Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds. 14 
 
Sterilisation 
 
The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised. 
 
 
Transparency 
 
Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published 
on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction 
holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis. 
 
 
Securities Markets Programme 
 
Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will 
continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be 
held to maturity. 
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